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Abstract In this study we investigate the impact of
early stage venture capital on innovation activities of
start-ups. This is done based on a cohort of start-ups
that is representative of all firms founded in Switzer-
land in 1996/97, as recorded by a census of the Swiss
Federal Statistical Office for this period. We analyze
not only the impact of early stage venture capital on
innovation performance 3 years after firm foundation,
but also 6 and 9 years after firm start, respectively, for
those firms that survived and reported continuously
innovation activities (persistence of innovation). The
results support neither the hypothesis of a positive
impact on initial innovation activities nor the hypoth-
esis of a positive time-persistent effect on innovation
performance of start-ups.
Keywords Venture capital  Start-ups 
Innovation performance
JEL Classifications L20  O31  L26
1 Introduction
Innovation activity is a costly task in that new firms
often cannot finance themselves as they generate only
limited cash flows and seed capital is often scarce.
They may also have difficulties gaining access to
external capital, as there is asymmetric information
between the owners of the start-ups and outside
investors (see, e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Binks and
Ennew 1996). Obtaining external financial resources
is especially burdensome when the start-ups intend to
engage in innovation activities because investment in
innovation is quite risky and increases the informa-
tional problems with external investors (see, e.g., Hall
2002; Savignac 2008). Venture capital can solve this
problem of financial constraints of innovative start-
ups. In exchange for the high risk that venture
capitalists have to bear by investing in innovative
start-ups, they usually get a significant portion of the
company’s ownership. Hence, venture capital is
widely believed to stimulate innovation activities of
start-ups and policy-makers around the globe attempt
to create or expand their local venture capital indus-
tries (Hirukawa and Ueda 2011).
Existing literature mostly focuses on indirect
effects of venture capital by means of enhancing the
growth of innovative firms. In general they identified a
positive impact (see, e.g., Cumming 2012 for a review
of this literature). There is also evidence for a positive
impact of venture capital at more aggregate levels of
industries or regions (see, e.g., Kortum and Lerner
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2000; Cumming 2012). Contrary to the existing vast
literature on the effects of venture capital on economic
performance (mostly firm growth, profitability or
stock market performance) relatively little is known
about the empirical relationship between venture
capital and innovation activities of start-ups, particu-
larly with respect to European start-ups.1 Based on US
sectoral panel data, Kortum and Lerner (2000) inves-
tigate the relationship between venture capital and
patenting. They look at a panel of 20 US manufactur-
ing industries between 1965 and 1992 and find that
venture capital funding is associated with sectors that
have higher contemporaneous patent production.
Moreover, the effect of venture capital on patenting
is significantly larger than the effect of R&D funding.
The authors estimated that venture capital may have
accounted for 8 % of industrial innovations in the
period 1983–1992. Hirukawa and Ueda (2011) con-
firm partly these findings by examining the relation-
ship between innovation and venture capital in a
longer time series of data for US manufacturing
covering the years 1968–2001. Using both total factor
productivity growth and patent counts as measures of
innovation, they find only little evidence for a positive
effect of venture capital on innovation.
In a recent study on the determinants of venture
capital investment for 23 European countries between
1995 and 2009 Bogliacino and Lucchese (2011) find
that the countries that are characterized by a higher
share of R&D expenditure, both public and business
R&D, show a significantly positive relationship to
venture capital investments. They conclude that higher
technological potential appears to stimulate the supply
as well as the demand of venture capital funds.
The tendency to positive effects of venture capital
on innovation (mostly patenting) in studies based on
more aggregated data is only partly confirmed at firm
level, where it is easier to account for the timing of
venture capital and innovation. With respect to
innovation input, Da Rin and Penas (2007) analyze
the role of venture finance in influencing the
innovation strategies of the funded companies based
on Dutch data. They find that venture capitalists push
firms towards building absorptive capacity and
towards more permanent in-house R&D efforts.
Peneder (2010) analyzes the impact of venture capital
on the share of sales from innovation for established
firms in Austria. Using a matching-approach he finds
no significant impact of venture capital on innovation
output. Based on data for Italian IPOs, Caselli et al.
(2009) find that funded companies even have regis-
tered fewer patents than non-funded firms in the period
after funding. The study of Engel and Keilbach (2007)
is based on German start-up data. They find that the
involvement of a venture capital company within
1 year after foundation date does neither affect the
propensity nor the intensity of patent application of the
start-ups (see Sect. 2 for a more detailed overview of
the firm level literature).
In this study we investigate the impact of early
stage venture capital on innovation activities of Swiss
start-ups. Compared to previous research our study
contributes to new knowledge in three ways. First, our
empirical basis is a sample of start-ups that is
representative of all firms founded in 1996/97 in
Switzerland as recorded by a census of the Swiss
Federal Statistical Office for this period. So far,
empirical evidence for the link between venture
capital and innovation activities of start-ups is scarce.
As new firms imply substantially high degrees of risk
and uncertainty (see Rosenbusch et al. 2013), one may
expect that the mode of dependence on venture capital
is different for young firms than for established firms.
Second, while previous studies mainly focused on
patent applications as a measure for innovation
activities, we analyze the impact of venture capital
on different measures that capture innovation input as
well as innovation output. Patent applications as a
measure of innovation is subject to some limitations
because (a) not all innovations are patentable and
(b) particularly for start-ups applying for a patent is
quite time-intensive and often too costly (see Griliches
1990; Hall et al. 2001). A third feature of our study is
that it is based on data of the surviving firms of the
cohort 1996/97 for three cross-sections, so that we can
follow the development of the start-ups over a period
of almost 10 years. This allows us to analyze the
impact of early stage venture capital not only on initial
innovation activities (3 years after firm foundation)
but also on the persistence of innovation activities.
1 See Da Rin et al. (2011) for a comprehensive survey
(including also the scarce literature on the effects on innova-
tion); Revest and Sapio (2012) with a focus on European studies;
and Rosenbusch et al. (2013) for meta-analysis of 75 empirical
studies on the economic effects of venture capital. Wright et al.
(2009) reviewed the empirical literature on the economic impact
not specifically of venture capital but in general of private
equity.
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This is of special relevance, as venture capital may not
have an effect on innovation in the initial stage (as
found by Engel and Keilbach 2007), but may instead
stimulate long-term innovation activities. In addition,
our survey provides us detailed information, espe-
cially with respect to founder characteristics, that
could be taken into account in the empirical analysis.
This allows us to use a matching framework that
accounts for endogenous selection.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the conceptual background, a review of
empirical literature at firm level and the research
hypotheses that are tested in the empirical part.
Section 3 provides a short descriptive analysis of the
data used in the paper. In Sect. 4 the specification of
the empirical models is presented. Section 5 deals
with the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Conceptual background, related empirical
literature and research hypotheses
2.1 Conceptual background
Previous literature dealing with venture capital iden-
tified two important functions of venture capital that
may stimulate the performance of funded firms (see
Rosenbusch et al. 2013 for a detailed overview of this
literature). Firstly, venture capital has a selection
function. Venture capitalists are typically specialized
in a narrow set of business and should thus be able to
identify particularly promising start-ups. Besides this
‘‘scout’’ function (Baum and Silverman 2004), venture
capital has a value creating function, as (a) the capital
itself increases the firms’ financial resources and
(b) venture capitalists often act as ‘‘coaches’’ (Hell-
mann 2000), supporting firms with financial as well as
other resources such as managerial experience, access
to informal networks and professional business mod-
els. Based on this conceptual background Hirukawa
and Ueda (2011) formulate two different hypotheses:
the ‘‘venture capital first hypothesis’’ and the ‘‘inno-
vation first hypothesis’’. While the second hypothesis
focuses on the selection effect, assuming that innova-
tions induce venture capital investments, the first
hypothesis deals with the value creating function,
assuming that venture capital spurs innovation activ-
ities. We concentrate here on the effect of venture
capital on the innovation performance of the funded
firms.
In our study we want to analyze the direct impact of
venture capital on innovation activities, thus focusing
on the ‘‘venture capital first’’ hypothesis. The identi-
fication of the direct effect of venture capital implies,
however, that we are able to capture the pure selection
effect, as firms, that were selected by venture capital-
ists because they previously showed strong innovation
capabilities, and are also expected to show higher
innovation activities afterwards. To overcome this
problem we apply a matching approach that controls in
detail for the initial innovation capabilities of the firms
(see Sect. 5.1 for a further discussion on this issue).
Based on the discussion above we formulate the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Early stage venture capital does
stimulate initial innovation activities of start-ups.
For both possible categories of venture capital
funded firms, those that developed innovation activ-
ities at the initial stage due to venture capital support
and those that were already innovative when they
received venture capital support, it is important to be
able to keep the pace of innovation for the critical
years after foundation. For the persistence of innova-
tion activities, financial backing in the form of venture
capital in addition to the firms’ own limited finance
sources (e.g., revenues from product sales) is thus of
critical importance. As venture capital funding is a
long-term engagement and capital requirement is even
larger for persistent innovation activities, we also
expect that:
Hypothesis 2 Early stage venture capital does
stimulate the persistence of innovation activities of
start-ups.
2.2 Related empirical literature
There are relatively few studies linking venture capital
funding to innovation performance. Most related to
our study is the study of Engel and Keilbach (2007)
that is based on German start-up data. They find that
the involvement of a venture capital company within
1 year after foundation date neither affects the
propensity nor the intensity of patent application of
the start-ups.
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Furthermore, a group of studies analyzes the impact
of venture capital on innovation activities for estab-
lished firms. Peneder (2010) analyzes the impact of
venture capital on the share of sales from innovation
for established firms in Austria. Using a matching-
approach he does not find any significant impact of
venture capital on innovation output. Based on data for
37 Italian IPOs, Caselli et al. (2009) find that
innovation is a crucial factor during the selection
phase but once the investment is made, the firms do not
promote innovation and concentrate all efforts to
improve other economic and managerial aspects. As a
result, funded companies even have registered fewer
patents than non-funded firms in the period after
funding. Focusing on innovation input rather than
output, Da Rin and Penas (2007) based on Dutch firm
data from the Community Innovation Survey CIS-3
and CIS-4 analyze the role of venture finance in
influencing the innovation strategies of the funded
companies. They find that venture capitalists push
firms towards building absorptive capacity and
towards more permanent in-house R&D efforts.
Further evidence on the linkage between innovation
and venture capital can be found in three US studies.
Hellmann and Puri (2000) use a sample of 170 firms in
Silicon Valley, including both ventured-backed and
non-venture firms, for which data for 1996/97 was
collected based on a survey. They find that firms
pursuing an innovator strategy rather than an imitator
strategy are more likely to obtain venture capital
(causality direction from innovation to venture capi-
tal). Further, they show that venture-funded compa-
nies are faster to bring products to market. Moreover,
this effect is more significant for innovating firms, for
which time to market is of greater importance than for
imitating firms (opposite causality direction from
venture capital to innovation). In a recent study based
on data for firms that received venture capital financ-
ing between 1980 and 2006, Tian and Wang (2013)
develop a measure of venture capital investors’
‘‘failure tolerance’’ based on the time it takes to shut
down failing firms. They find that firms backed by
more failure-tolerant venture capital investors are
more innovative. Based on a large dataset consisting
of a sample of ventured-backed firms in the United
States, Chemmanur et al. (2011) show that corporate
venture capitalists help funded firms achieve a higher
degree of innovation performance as measured by
patenting compared to independent venture capitalists.
On the whole, empirical evidence at the firm level
for a positive effect is rather scarce.2 Both studies from
the German-speaking countries could not find any
effect on innovation, presumably due to the fact that
the venture capital industry in these countries is less
developed than in the United States or in the United
Kingdom (see Revest and Sapio 2012). Nevertheless,
many policy makers not only in the United States but
also in Europe have a perception that venture capital
has much to do with the rising leadership of US firms
in high-technology industries, although relatively little
is known about the real effects of venture capital
(Gompers and Lerner 2001).
3 Description of the data
3.1 Construction of the dataset
The firm data we use in this study refers to the cohort
of Swiss enterprises that were founded between 1996
and 1997. This cohort was registered by the Swiss
Federal Statistical Office and contained all ‘‘green-
field’’ start-ups (that is, without mergers and manager-
takeovers) that were founded in this period and
reported at least 20 h of business activities per week.3
At the beginning the cohort contained 7,112 firms.
In 2000, we checked which firms of this cohort still
existed. We defined a firm to have exited when it did
not answer our questionnaire and (a) was not regis-
tered in the Swiss Commercial Register anymore or
(b) the exit was verified by telephone. A graphical
overview of the evolution of the sample over time is
presented in Fig. 1. A total of 3,288 (46.2 %) of these
start-ups were still in business in 2000. Among the
firms that still existed by that time, data were collected
by means of a postal survey. Of them, 49.4 % (1625)
answered the questionnaire; 1,339 (82.4 %) of these
firms survived the next 3 years. In 2003 a follow-up
2 Even more scarce is the literature about the role of venture
capital in Switzerland. To our knowledge, only the study of
Hopp (2007) deals with venture capital in Switzerland. The aim
of this paper is the investigation of the behavior of venture
capital in Switzerland with respect to financing mechanisms
employed and the extent to which collaboration between venture
capitalists is used to cope with informational barriers.
3 The firms were recorded by the Swiss Federal Statistical
Office independent of whether they were enrolled in the Swiss
Commercial Register or not.
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survey was conducted among these firms. Answers
were received from 70.6 % (945). In 2006, 9–10 years
after firm foundation, 857 (90.7 %) of the participants
of the 2003 survey still existed, from which 73.5 %
(630) were willing to fill out a third questionnaire. For
many firms we thus have data at different points in
time. For firms which exited the sample we know
whether the firm still existed at the time of exit, also
whether the firm survived the following period of
3 years.
3.2 Characteristics of the start-ups
Detailed descriptive sample information is presented
in Table 7. Most of the start-ups in the dataset are
firms in the service sector. In each point of time service
firms represent about 83 % of the observations. About
9 % belong to the construction sector, the remaining
8 % to the manufacturing sector. These shares
remained almost constant during the period
2000–2006. In the service sector the sub-sector of
modern (knowledge-intensive) services (e.g., banking
and insurance, business services) has a larger share
than the sub-sector of traditional services (e.g., trade,
hotels and catering); the share of modern services
increased considerably between 2000 and 2006. In the
manufacturing sector there are slightly more low-tech
than high-tech start-ups.
The observed start-ups are for the most part small
firms. In each survey more than 80 % of the
enterprises employed less than five employees (mea-
sured in full-time equivalents). The average firm size
only slightly increased from one period to the next.
While in 2000 the firms had on average a size of 2.6
employees, the average size increased to 3.3 employ-
ees in 2003 and 4.8 employees in 2006. In 2006,
10 years since their foundation, only 6.5 % of the
firms employed more than ten employees.
Besides this basic firm information, the question-
naire covered questions about firm success and
activity level, resource endowment, innovative activ-
ities, the market environment and the financial struc-
ture. In 2000, the questionnaire included some
additional questions about the founder characteristics
(e.g., gender, age, education, experience and the
wealth of the firm founders).
Many firms in our sample did not have innovation
activities. Half of them did not introduce new or
modified products in the first 3 years after firm
foundation, and only about 3 % already had a patent
application in this period. Furthermore, only a small
fraction of the firms had persistent innovation activ-
ities (see Table 8 for descriptive information about the
frequency of innovation activities). This is not a
surprising result, as the small firm size indicates that
not all firms had the resources for persistent innovation
activities.
The identification of venture-funded firms is based
on a variable that measures the importance of venture
capital within a list of other internal and external
sources of capital during the first 3 years after firm
foundation (five-level ordinal variables; level 1: ‘very
low’; level 5: ‘very high’). This variable was trans-
formed to a binary variable that takes value one if the
value of the original variable was above one and value
zero if not.4 Our definition of venture capital finance is
thus based on early stage investments. To make sure
that our control group is not affected by venture capital
at a later stage, we drop all firms that received venture
capital only after 2000.
As not all responding firms answered all the
questions, the final sample used for model estimation
Fig. 1 Evolution of the
sample over time
4 To test the robustness with respect to this transformation, we
also tested a more restrictive definition of venture-financed firms
(see Sect. 5.2 and Table 6B).
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is somewhat smaller. In the final estimates 1,228
observations remain for cross-section 2000, 683 for
cross-section 2003 and 445 for cross-section 2006.
Thus, 117, 61 and 40 of them, respectively, received
early stage venture capital (for a detailed character-
ization of these firms see Sect. 5.1). Accordingly, the
share of venture-financed firms remained almost
constant over time at nearly 10 % for each cross-
section.5
4 Econometric framework
4.1 Potential econometric problems
To be able to make a statement on the impact of
venture capital on innovation performance, we have to
overcome two problems (see Engel and Keilbach 2007
for a detailed description of these problems in the
context of the assessment of the performance effects of
venture capital). The first one is a missing data
problem. We have only one observable outcome per
firm, either with treatment or without treatment. Thus,
it is difficult to assess how a firm with venture capital
would have performed without venture capital. The
second problem is that self-selection into treatment is
usually at work by venture capital financing. Before
firms get venture capital, venture capitalists usually
analyze the costs and benefits of such an investment.
Accordingly, selection into treatment should be
strongly related to the expected benefits of such an
investment. This makes it difficult to identify the
performance effects that are generated by venture
capital, e.g., it is not advisable to take the mean
outcome of non-treated firms as an approximation.
There are different solutions to overcome these
problems. In line with previous firm-level studies in
this area, we apply the matching approach as it seems
to be well suited for our data.6 The basic idea of this
approach is to compare the average outcome of the
treated firms with average outcomes of structurally
similar firms that are not treated. To ensure that the
matching approach identifies and consistently esti-
mates the treatment effect of interest, two key
assumptions are required. First, the ‘conditional
independence assumption’ (CIA) implies that, given
a vector of observed variables which are not affected
by treatment, assignment to treatment is independent
of the outcomes. Second, the ‘common support
condition’ (CSC) ensures that firms with the same
vector of observed firm-specific variables have a
positive probability of belonging to both treatment and
control group. In our case, the two key assumptions
should not be violated. As our study is based on a
representative sample of start-ups, we have a large
group of firms that did not receive venture funding,
what should ensure the finding of good matches for the
treated firms. Furthermore, the data set includes
detailed information on the founder characteristics,
the internal firm characteristics as well as the external
market conditions. This allows us to control in detail
for factors that may influence the treatment status and
the outcome variables but are not affected themselves
by treatment.
4.2 Implementing the matching approach
Due to the high dimensionality of the covariate vector
that explains selection into treatment, we will use the
propensity score matching (PSM) approach intro-
duced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The idea of
this procedure is to match firms based on balancing
scores, i.e. on the probability of treatment given a
vector of observed characteristics (for a detailed
description of this approach see Caliendo and Kopei-
nig 2008). To evaluate these propensity scores, a
selection equation is estimated in a first step. In a
second step, firms from the treatment group and firms
from the control group are matched, and the outcome
of a treated firm with the outcomes of comparison
group members are contrasted. We compare the
5 Note that this share is based on the final estimation sample that
excludes firms that received venture funding only after 2000.
Obviously the share of firms that received early stage venture
capital would be lower, when all firms are included. Further-
more, the share of venture financed firms significantly decreases
when we use a more restrictive definition (firms with a value of
the original variable above 3). However, such a modification
affects our results only marginally (see Table 6B).
6 An alternative solution to estimate causal effects would have
been to apply an instrumental variable (IV) approach. In contrast
Footnote 6 continued
to the matching approach, IV estimation can provide consistent
results even in the presence of hidden bias. However, this typ-
ically comes at the costs of a reduced precision of the estimates
and introduces new uncertainty from its reliance on additional
untestable assumptions (see DiPrete and Gangl 2004).
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outcomes for five different measures of innovation
activities.
4.2.1 Estimating the propensity scores
As the receiving of venture capital is a binary
treatment, probit models are used to estimate the
propensity scores. To support the CIA a broad set of
variables is tested as explanatory variables in the
selection equation. A first group of variables describes
the founder characteristics (age, gender, type of
education,7 measure for creativity), and a second one
controls for sources of finance other than venture
capital (personal savings, retained earnings, private
loans, bank loans, customer pre-payment, supplier
credit and public funding). A third group deals with
the general firm characteristics (legal form, indepen-
dency of the firm, education level of the employees,
availability of a business plan, number of customers,
sales share of exports, firm size), a fourth one controls
for external market conditions (intensity of price
competition, intensity of non-price competition). Fur-
thermore, we control in detail for geographical region
and industry affiliation.8 The information for these
variables comes from the survey that is described in
Sect. 3.1. The variables used in the propensity
equation include some of the most important deter-
minants of innovation and/or economic performance
at firm level.
4.2.2 Matching procedure
In view of the complexity of the innovation process
characterized by several stages from basic research to
the penetration of the market with new products, an
approach relying on a single measure of innovation
may leave out important relationships and produce
results that are not robust (see, e.g., Rogers 1998;
Kleinknecht et al. 2002). In this study we use five
binary innovation measures covering the input as well
as the output side of the innovation process. In our
model, innovation output is measured (a) by the
introduction of new products, (b) the introduction of
significantly modified products and (c) the introduc-
tion of either new or modified products. The existence
of R&D activities indicates innovation input. The
patent application variable captures input as well as
output characteristics (see Griliches 1990). As our
study is based on a broad sample of green-field start-
ups that are mostly small, innovation intensity of most
firms is expected to be low. Accordingly, we expect
that the switch between 0 and 1 would represent the
most important information with respect to their
innovation decisions. The binary variables should
thus be adequate proxies for the innovation activities
of the firms in our sample.
As our dataset follows the development of the
cohort of start-ups over a period of 10 years, we can
analyze not only whether venture capital affects initial
innovation activities, but also whether it affects the
persistence of innovation activities. For each of the
five innovation variables mentioned above we thus
estimate three different models. The first one analyzes
the impact of venture capital on innovation activities
in the first 3 years (1996/97–2000), the second deals
with its impact on the persistence of innovation
activities in the first two periods (innovation activities
in the period 1996/97–2000 and 2000–2003) and the
third model analyzes the impact on innovation persis-
tence over the whole sample period (innovation
activities in the periods 1996/97–2000, 2000–2003
and 2003–2006).
As matching method we chose the nearest-neighbor
matching algorithm without replacement because the
number of firms in the control group (about ten times
the number in the treatment group) seems to be
sufficiently large to find good matches.9 To impose a
common support we dropped treatment observations
whose propensity score was higher than the maximum
or less than the minimum propensity score of the
7 As most firms in our sample are small, the education variable
for the whole firm captures to a large extent also the impact of
the education level of the firm founders. As measures for the
education level of the firm founders and our measure for the
qualification level of all employees are strongly correlated, it
was not possible to control for both effects separately.
8 Despite the inclusion of this broad set of variables, there are of
course still certain aspects that we cannot control for but may
have an effect on both innovation and the propensity of venture
capital funding (e.g., founder personality, risk preferences).
However, most of these unobserved aspects are expected to
stimulate innovation and would lead to an upward bias of our
results. As we find an insignificant effect of venture capital on
innovation, this argument would strengthen the plausibility of
our results.
9 Results were similar in alternative estimates where we
allowed replacement.
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controls. Furthermore, bootstrapping was applied to
correct the standard errors.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Selection model
In line with related studies that use a matching
framework in order to investigate the effects of
venture funding on innovation performance (see Engel
and Keilbach 2007; Peneder 2010), the selection
equation includes different variables that describe the
founder characteristics, the financial structure of the
firms, the general firm characteristics and the external
market conditions (see Table 1 for a detailed descrip-
tion of the variables). Furthermore, we control in detail
for regional aspects and industry affiliation. In accor-
dance with theoretical and empirical findings (e.g.,
Arvanitis and Stucki 2012) these variables describe in
detail the initial innovation capabilities of the firms
and thus allow to capture potential selection effects.10
As some firms dropped out of our sample between two
cross-sections, the number of observations that can be
used to identify the treatment effect varies substantially
between different definitions of the target variables.
While 1,228 observations can be used to identify the
impact of venture capital on the propensity of innova-
tion activities in the initial period 1996/97–2000, only
445 observations remain to identify the impact on the
persistence of innovation activities over the whole
sample period 1996/97–2006. To increase the match-
ing quality, selection models are estimated for the same
set of observations that could also be used to identify
the treatment effect afterwards. Accordingly, we
estimate for each observation period a separate selec-
tion model. The results of the final selection models are
presented in Table 2.
The quality of the selection model is quite impres-
sive for a model based on firm-level survey data.
Pseudo-R2 varies between 0.24 and 0.30, log-likeli-
hood values between 77.99 and 187.42.11 Due to the
much lower number of observations available in
models 2 and 3 it is not surprising that not all
significant effects of model 1 can be identified. Most
effects remain, however, robust across the different
samples. The results show that the founder character-
istics are important selection criteria with respect to
venture capital. Young and male founders with a
technical education background and a high degree of
creativity have a significant higher propensity to be
venture-funded. Furthermore, the financial structure
differs for firms that receive venture capital funding.
While private loans, customer prepayments and public
funding seem to be complementary sources of fund-
ing, personal savings are shown to be substitutes of
venture capital. Compared with the first two groups of
explanatory variables, general firm characteristics are
of lower relevance for describing the propensity of
venture capital funding. Firms with a limited legal
form and legally independent subsidiaries tend to have
a higher venture capital propensity. Furthermore,
venture financed firms seem to focus on fewer
customers. General market conditions measured as
intensity of competition do not affect the venture
capital decision.
Besides the fact that our results seem intuitively
plausible, they are also mostly in line with results of
previous studies. The study of Engel and Keilbach
(2007) is based on related data and allows a compar-
ison of some of the results. In line with our finding,
they also find a positive gender effect and a positive
effect for limited companies. However, in contrast to
their study, we cannot identify a positive firm size
effect. This difference is probably driven by a lower
variance in firm size in our sample. Furthermore, they
could identify a positive education level effect. In our
sample the positive effect of the share of tertiary
employees is not statistically significant.12
10 Actually, a few of the model variables refer to the starting
period 1996/97–2000 and not to the foundation of the firm (see
Table 1). Accordingly, some of the variables do not directly
describe the firms’ ‘initial’ innovation capabilities. This is,
however, only a marginal limitation, as the low variance of these
variables between the different cross-sections indicates that they
primarily measure time invariant firm characteristics.
11 In further estimates not presented here, we reduced the
variance of the estimates by dropping potential explanatory
variables if they did not have a significant impact. This
modification did not affect our results.
12 While Engel and Keilbach (2007) use the education level of
the firm founders as proxy for the education level, we use the
education level within the whole firm. However, due to the small
average firm size these two variables are strongly correlated in
our case. Accordingly, it is not surprising that we also cannot
identify a significant effect for the education level of the firm
founders.
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As mentioned before, propensity score matching is
only a valid procedure if the CIA and CSC hold.
Separate tests on these two assumptions for the
different models are presented in Tables 9, 10 and
11 in the Appendix. In a first step, the success of the
matching was tested. Propensity score matching
requires that the treatment group and the control
group are similar in each aspect. To check this
Table 1 Variable definition and measurement
Variable Definition/measurement
Propensity of new products Development and introduction of new products yes/no
Propensity of modified products Development and introduction of modified existing products yes/no
Propensity of either new or
modified products
Development and introduction of new/modified existing products yes/no
Propensity of R&D activities R&D activities yes/no
Propensity of patent application Patent applications yes/no
Average_age Average age of the firm founders
Dominant_gender Dominant gender of the firm founders: male/female (value 1: ‘male’; value 0: ‘female’; the most
frequently reported gender is regarded as representative for the firm founders; when the
number of ‘females’ equals the number of ‘males’, we set ‘female’)
Technical_share Share of firm founders with a technical education
Creativity Creativity is an important strength of the founding team [five-level ordinal variables (level 1:
‘very weak’; level 5: ‘very strong’)]
Personal_savings Importance of personal savings to finance the firm activities [five-level ordinal variables (level 1:
‘very weak’; level 5: ‘very strong’)]
Retained_earning Importance of retained earnings to finance the firm activities [five-level ordinal variables (level
1: ‘very weak’; level 5: ‘very strong’)]
Bank_loan Importance of bank loans to finance the firm activities [five-level ordinal variables (level 1: ‘very
weak’; level 5: ‘very strong’)]
Customer_prepayments Importance of customer prepayments to finance the firm activities [five-level ordinal variables
(level 1: ‘very weak’; level 5: ‘very strong’)]
Supplier_credit Importance of supplier credits to finance the firm activities [five-level ordinal variables (level 1:
‘very weak’; level 5: ‘very strong’)]
Public_limited_company Public limited company [dummy variable with other legal forms as reference group (e.g., sole
proprietorship or general partnership)]
Private_limited_company Private limited company [dummy variable with other legal forms as reference group (e.g., sole
proprietorship or general partnership)]
Legally_independent Firm is legally independent yes/no (dummy variable with legally independent subsidiaries as
reference group)
Tertiary_employees Employees with tertiary-level education yes/no
Business_plan Firm started with a business plan yes/no
Many_customers Firm has many customers yes/no
Export_share Share of exports on sales; natural logarithm
Firm_size Number of employees at time of firm foundation (dummy variables for three firm size classes:
(a) more than 1 and less than 2 full time equivalents (FTE); (b) more than 2 and less than 4
FTE; (c) more than 4 FTE; reference group: ‘1 or less FTE’)
Price_competition Intensity of price competition (five-level ordinal variable: level 1: ‘very weak’; level 5: ‘very
strong’)
Non_price_competition Intensity of price competition (five-level ordinal variable: level 1: ‘very weak’; level 5: ‘very
strong’)
Region dummies Dummies for six regions (Northwestern Switzerland; Zurich; Eastern Switzerland; Central
Switzerland; Lac Le´man; Ticino; reference region: ‘Espace Midland’)
Industry dummies Dummies for 18 industries
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assumption, we first tested whether the mean value of
each model variable after matching was the same in
the treatment group and in the control group. Based on
t tests, the null hypothesis that the conditions of the
two groups do not differ after matching could not be
rejected at the 10 % significance level for any
explanatory variables in the three models. Further-
more, likelihood-ratio tests indicated joint insignifi-
cance of all the right-hand variables after matching. In
a next step, we graphically examined the CSC. The
graphics showed that after dropping treatment obser-
vations whose propensity score was higher than the
maximum or less than the minimum propensity score
of the controls (‘off support’ observations), there was
to a large extent an overlap of the propensity scores of
the treated and untreated firms for each model. We can
thus assume that common support is given.
5.2 Treatment effect
5.2.1 Main results
Estimations for the average treatment effect for the
treated (ATT) that are based on our representative
sample of start-ups are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5.
Table 3 presents the results for initial innovation
activities in the period 1996/97–2000, Table 4 the
results for the persistence of innovation activities
during the first 5–6 years, and Table 5 the results for
the persistence over the whole sample period
1996/97–2006.
In line with general expectations we find that on
average venture financed firms have a higher
Table 2 Selection equations for the different target variables


























































































































































Region dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 1,228 683 445
Log-likelihood 187.42*** 125.78*** 77.99***
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.30 0.29
See Table 1 for the variable definitions; standard errors are in brackets
under the coefficients
***, **, * Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % test level,
respectively
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propensity of initial innovation activities than other
firms (see Table 3). The difference is significant for
four out of five measures of innovation propensity.
Only with respect to R&D activities, our measure for
innovation input, the difference is statistically insig-
nificant. However, the statistical significance of these
differences disappear when we control for the initial
innovation capabilities of the firms. After matching,
venture-financed firms do not show a significantly
higher propensity of innovation activities than their
non-venture funded firm counterparts, with the
exception of a rather weak effect with respect to
patenting propensity. Thus, hypothesis 1 does not
receive empirical support.
Table 4 presents the results for the investigation of
differences between venture-financed firms and non-
venture funded firms with respect to the persistence of
innovation activities over the period 1996/97–2003. In
this case, unmatched venture-financed firms show on
average a higher propensity than non-venture funded
companies only with respect to the introduction of
either new or significantly modified products. As for
Table 3 Treatment effect for the treated with respect to innovation activities in the period 1996/97–2000












0.072** 0.100** 0.121** 0.010 0.038**
t value 2.11 2.10 2.50 0.24 2.49
ATT 0.017 0.017 0.017 -0.026 0.043
z value 0.31 0.25 0.26 -0.42 1.64
95 % confidence
interval
[-0.089; 0.123] [-0.119; 0.153] [-0.111; 0.145] [-0.145; 0.094] [-0.008; 0.094]
N treated 117 117 117 117 117
N untreated 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110
N off support 1 1 1 1 1
Bootstrapping is used to correct standard errors of ATT (1,000 replications)
***, **, * Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % test level, respectively
Table 4 Treatment effect for the treated with respect to persistent innovation activities in both periods 1996/97–2000 and
2000–2003












0.039 0.063 0.105* 0.044 0.022
t value 1.44 1.14 1.70 0.97 1.55
ATT 0.016 -0.016 -0.033 0.0 0.033
z value 0.32 -0.19 -0.34 0.00 1.12
95 % confidence
interval
[-0.083; 0.116] [-0.187; 0.155] [-0.224; 0.158] [-0.145; 0.145] [-0.025; 0.090]
N treated 61 61 61 61 61
N untreated 620 620 620 620 620
N off support 2 2 2 2 2
Bootstrapping is used to correct standard errors of ATT (1,000 replications)
***, **, * Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % test level, respectively
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the initial stage, no statistically significant differences
for the five innovation measures could be found with
respect to the persistence of innovation activities over
the period 1996/97–2003 after matching. The results
for the persistence of innovation activities over the
longer period 1996/97–2006 look quite similar (see
Table 5). Before matching, only the propensity to
introduce either new or significantly modified prod-
ucts is significantly higher for venture-financed firms.
After matching, all differences are statistically insig-
nificant. Accordingly, also hypothesis 2 is not sup-
ported by empirical evidence.
Our results are also in line with the findings of the
two studies for Germany (Engel and Keilbach 2007)
and Austria (Peneder 2010). Thus, venture capital does
not make the individual firm more innovative, but it
selects more innovative firms and possibly helps them
to grow faster, which is not tested in this paper but
often reported in existing literature.
We also find that statistically significant differences
of innovation performance in favor of venture-
financed firms disappear after matching. Thus, ven-
ture-financed firms do not perform significantly better
than other firms. In accordance with the ‘innovation
first hypothesis’ we can also conclude that the
observed differences in innovation performance
before matching seem to reflect the selection effects
prior to funding and not to be driven by the direct
causal impact of venture capital funding itself.
To our knowledge, the impact of venture capital on
the persistence of innovation activities has not been
analyzed so far. Contrary to the results for initial
innovation for the period between 1996/97 and 2000,
venture-financed firms do not show before matching a
significantly higher persistence of innovation activi-
ties than other firms. As a consequence, our results
indicate that with respect to the persistence of
innovation activities neither the value-providing func-
tion nor the selection function of venture capital seem
to be effective. A reason for the low relevance of the
selection function in the longer period may be that
even for specialized experts it is difficult to predict a
firm’s long term innovation activities based on its
initial characteristics.
5.2.2 Robustness checks
Our results may be driven by the special characteris-
tics of our data. First, all our innovation measures are
based on binary variables. Accordingly, our results
may hold with respect to innovation propensity, but
probably not for measures of innovation intensity.
However, the results of previous studies show that this
does not seem to be the case. To the best of our
knowledge, no previous firm-level study has found a
significantly positive impact of venture capital on the
intensity of innovation activities after controlling for
the selection effect.
Table 5 Treatment effect for the treated with respect to persistent innovation activities in all three periods 1996/97–2000,
2000–2003 and 2003–2006








Unmatched difference 0.033 0.049 0.143** 0.034
t value 1.40 0.82 2.08 0.69
ATT 0.05 0 0.1 0.075
z value 1.06 0.00 0.87 0.98
95 % confidence interval [-0.042; 0.142] [-0.200; 0.200] [-0.125; 0.325] [-0.075; 0.225]
N treated 40 40 40 40
N untreated 405 405 405 405
N off support 0 0 0 0
Bootstrapping is used to correct standard errors of ATT (1,000 replications). Due to the low number of firms that made patent
applications in all three periods, no statistics are presented for this measure of innovation activities
***, **, * Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % test level, respectively
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Second, the results with respect to persistence of
innovation activities may be insignificant, as we use a
quite restrictive definition of persistence. To test the
robustness of the results that are based on the long
period (Table 5), we alternatively use a less restrictive
definition of persistence. For these estimates we define
innovation as persistent when a firm had innovation
activities at least in two out of three periods. The
estimation results confirm previous results (see
Table 6A). While the modification slightly increases
the unmatched differences (whereupon most differ-
ences are still not statistically significant), the treat-
ment effect is still statistically insignificant for all
innovation measures.
A third special characteristic of our data is that our
definition of venture funding is based on a binary
variable that does not measure the volume of received
funding. Intuitively we would expect that the impact
of venture capital on future innovation activities is
positively correlated with the volume of funding.
Accordingly, our results may be driven by firms that
received only little funding from venture capitalists.
To deal with this point, we alternatively estimate the
model for the initial stage presented in Table 3 based
on a more restrictive definition of venture funding.13
To this end, we transform our five-level ordinary
variable to a binary variable that takes value 1 if the
value of the original variable was above 3 and value 0
if not. Results for the respective estimates are
presented in Table 6B. While this modification tends
to increase the unmatched differences between ven-
ture-financed firms and other firms, the differences
after matching remain insignificant, with the exception
of patenting propensity. The respective difference is
after matching statistically significant at the 10 %-
level. As patenting is probably a quite costly form of
innovation activities, at least for new small firms, it is
not surprising that the difference for this variable
becomes statistically significant when we control for
funding intensity.
Another problem could be that the time distance
between venture capital funding and measurement of
the innovation propensity is too short. To deal with
this fact we tested in alternative estimates, whether the
impact of venture capital increases, when we increase
the time lag (see Table 6C1, C2). These estimates
confirm the results of our main estimates with respect
to hypotheses 1 and 2.
6 Summary and conclusions
In this study we investigate the impact of early stage
venture capital on innovation activities of Swiss start-
ups. This is done based on a cohort of start-ups that is
representative of all firms founded in Switzerland in
1996/97 as recorded by a census of the Swiss Federal
Statistical Office for this period. The further develop-
ment of still existing firms is pursued through three
surveys in 2000, 2003 and 2006, respectively, during a
period of 10 years. In accordance with the literature
we test the direct impact of venture capital on
innovation activities, thus focusing on the ‘‘venture
capital first’’ hypothesis. The identification of the
direct effect of venture capital implies, however, that
we are able to capture the pure selection effect, as
firms that were selected by venture capitalists because
they previously showed strong innovation capabilities
are also expected to show higher innovation activities
afterwards. To overcome this problem we apply a
matching approach that controls in detail for the initial
innovation capabilities of the firms including several
characteristics of the founding persons. We analyze
not only the impact of early stage venture capital on
innovation performance 3 years after firm foundation
but also 6 and 9 years after firm start, respectively, for
those firms that survived so long and reported
continuous innovation activities (persistence of
innovation).
The results support neither the hypothesis of a
positive impact on initial innovation activities nor the
hypothesis of a positive time-persistent effect on
innovation performance of start-ups. As expected,
venture-funded start-ups show a significantly higher
innovation propensity than non-funded firms but this
superiority disappears after matching. These findings
can be interpreted as hints that venture capitalists do
select for funding start-ups with a potential of above-
average innovation performance but this funding does
not seem to contribute to a statistically discernible
higher innovation performance as compared with
start-ups with similar structural characteristics that
do not receive venture capital. Additional estimates
13 As the more restrictive definition of venture funding
significantly decreased the number of treated firms, it was not
possible to re-estimate the models dealing with the persistence
of innovation as well.
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Table 6 Model extensions (ATT for different sub-samples)










A: Less restrictive definition of persistence (estimates for period 1996/97–2006)
Unmatched difference 0.071 0.10 0.146* 0.075 0.042**
t value 1.53 1.24 1.76 1.17 2.45
ATT 0.075 0.1 0.125 0.075 0.05
z value 0.94 0.81 1.11 0.71 1.27
95 % confidence interval [-0.081; 0.231] [-0.142; 0.342] [-0.096; 0.346] [-0.133; 0.283] [-0.027; 0.127]
N treated 40 40 40 40 40
N untreated 405 405 405 405 405
N off support 0 0 0 0 0
B: Only intensive use of venture capital (impact on innovation activities in the period 1996/97–2000)
Unmatched difference 0.169*** 0.085 0.196** 0.141** 0.097***
t value 3.05 1.10 2.51 2.08 3.97
ATT 0.146 -0.024 0.122 0.073 0.098*
z value 1.38 -0.20 1.08 0.64 1.70
95 % confidence interval [-0.061; 0.353] [-0.267; 0.218] [-0.099; 0.343] [-0.150; 0.297] [-0.015; 0.210]
N treated 41 41 41 41 41
N untreated 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186
N off support 1 1 1 1 1
C: Increase time lag between venture capital funding and measurement of innovation activities
C1: Treatment effect for the treated with respect to innovation activities in the period 2000–2003
Unmatched difference 0.068 0.019 0.082 0.046 0.016
t value 1.63 0.30 1.24 0.91 0.90
ATT 0.049 -0.098 -0.066 0.016 0.016
z value 0.68 -1.06 -0.69 0.19 0.52
95 % confidence interval [-0.093; 0.191] [-0.280; 0.084] [-0.251; 0.120] [-0.152; 0.185] [-0.046; 0.078]
N treated 61 61 61 61 61
N untreated 620 620 620 620 620
N off support 2 2 2 2 2
C2: Treatment effect for the treated with respect to persistent innovation activities in both periods 2000–2003 and 2003–2006
Unmatched difference 0.060* 0.050 0.151** 0.049
t value 1.76 0.72 2.02 0.96
ATT 0.050 0.025 0.125 0.100
z value 0.76 0.24 1.03 1.17
95 % confidence interval [-0.078; 0.178] [-0.183; 0.233] [-0.112; 0.362] [-0.067; 0.267]
N treated 40 40 40 40
N untreated 405 405 405 405
N off support 0 0 0 0
Bootstrapping is used to correct standard errors of ATT (1,000 replications). Due to the low number of firms that made patent
applications in both periods, no statistics are presented for this measure of innovation activities
***, **, * Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % test level, respectively
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based on (a) an alternative specification of the venture
capital variable and (b) on a less restrictive definition
of persistence yield no additional insights, but dem-
onstrate the robustness of the main results. On the
whole, the results of our study are in accordance with
the findings of the few other studies that analyze the
direct linkage between venture capital and a firm’s
innovation activities. Results of previous studies,
however, indicate that there may be an indirect linkage
on the aggregated level. As venture capital (a) selects
more innovative firms and (b) seems to stimulate the
economic performance (e.g., growth) of these firms,
aggregated innovation may nevertheless be positively
affected by venture capital funding.
Specific features of the study that demonstrate the
original elements it contributes to the literature are that
(a) it is based on a sample of greenfield start-ups that is
representative for the entire cohort 1996/97 of Swiss
start-ups, (b) it uses several innovation measures
(other than patenting), and (c) examines the effect on
innovation persistence. This last point is relevant also
for policy makers that pursue policy concepts of
innovation promotion through venture capital funding
and can be seen as a warning of too optimistic
expectations with respect to the effectiveness of such
concepts.
Appendix
See Tables 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.
Table 7 Descriptive statistics based on model (1); N = 1,228
Statistic Mean Std. dev. Min Max
new_products 0.15 0.35 0 1
modified_products 0.42 0.49 0 1
new/modified_products 0.50 0.50 0 1
R&D_activities 0.25 0.43 0 1
patent_applications 0.03 0.16 0 1
Founder characteristics
average_age 39.47 9.19 18 65
dominant_gender 0.74 0.44 0 1
technical_share 0.44 0.45 0 1
Table 8 Descriptive information about the frequency of
innovation activities for the firms that answered all three
questionnaires (N = 630)







new_products 75.4 22.4 2.2
modified_products 34.9 50.6 14.4
new/modified_products 30.5 47.8 21.7
R&D_activities 68.1 22.7 9.2
patent_applications 96.0 3.8 0.2
Table 7 continued
Statistic Mean Std. dev. Min Max
creativity 3.87 1.05 1 5
Financial structure
personal_savings 4.09 1.27 1 5
retained_earning 2.61 1.62 1 5
private_loans 1.86 1.40 1 5
bank_loan 1.60 1.14 1 5
customer_prepayments 1.28 0.85 1 5
supplier_credit 1.19 0.63 1 5
public_funding 1.08 0.45 1 5
Firm characteristics
public_limited_company 0.18 0.38 0 1
private_limited_company 0.26 0.44 0 1
legally_independent 0.97 0.16 0 1
tertiary_employees 0.67 0.47 0 1
business_plan 0.41 0.49 0 1
many_customers 0.53 0.50 0 1
export_share 0.10 0.24 0 1
firm_size_1–2 0.28 0.45 0 1
firm_size_2–4 0.11 0.31 0 1
firm_size_ [4 0.06 0.24 0 1
Market conditions
price_competition 0.42 0.49 0 1
non_price_competition 0.54 0.50 0 1
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Table 9 Test balancing property and common support of model (1)
Variable Sample Treated Control t p [ |t|
Founder characteristics
average_age Unmatched 37.458 39.682 -2.50 0.012
Matched 37.508 38.112 -0.54 0.592
dominant_gender Unmatched 0.80508 0.72793 1.81 0.071
Matched 0.80342 0.79487 0.16 0.871
technical_share Unmatched 0.48164 0.43559 1.05 0.294
Matched 0.47721 0.45726 0.35 0.730
creativity Unmatched 4.1271 3.8432 2.81 0.005
Matched 4.1282 4.0855 0.34 0.734
Financial structure
personal_savings Unmatched 3.678 4.1297 -3.69 0.000
Matched 3.7009 3.3846 1.60 0.111
retained_earning Unmatched 3.0339 2.5649 2.99 0.003
Matched 3.0342 3.2308 -0.94 0.348
private_loans Unmatched 2.6441 1.7775 6.50 0.000
Matched 2.6239 2.5983 0.12 0.903
bank_loan Unmatched 1.8559 1.5748 2.54 0.011
Matched 1.8547 1.8632 -0.05 0.958
customer_prepayments Unmatched 1.5932 1.2477 4.22 0.000
Matched 1.5726 1.5641 0.05 0.957
supplier_credit Unmatched 1.3644 1.1667 3.26 0.001
Matched 1.3675 1.3846 -0.15 0.883
public_funding Unmatched 1.322 1.0559 6.26 0.000
Matched 1.3248 1.2393 0.78 0.439
Firm characteristics
public_limited_company Unmatched 0.38983 0.15676 6.38 0.000
Matched 0.38462 0.39316 -0.13 0.894
private_limited_company Unmatched 0.32203 0.25135 1.67 0.095
Matched 0.32479 0.40171 -1.22 0.223
legally_independent Unmatched 0.89831 0.98288 -5.64 0.000
Matched 0.90598 0.90598 -0.00 1.000
tertiary_employees Unmatched 0.77119 0.65766 2.50 0.013
Matched 0.76923 0.74359 0.46 0.649
business_plan Unmatched 0.5339 0.3991 2.84 0.005
Matched 0.52991 0.53846 -0.13 0.896
many_customers Unmatched 0.5 0.53784 -0.78 0.434
Matched 0.50427 0.57265 -1.05 0.296
export_share Unmatched 0.88903 0.80618 0.57 0.567
Matched 0.89663 0.91433 -0.09 0.932
firm_size_1–2 Unmatched 0.33051 0.27117 1.37 0.171
Matched 0.32479 0.36752 -0.68 0.494
firm_size_2–4 Unmatched 0.17797 0.1045 2.41 0.016
Matched 0.17949 0.17949 0.00 1.000
864 S. Arvanitis, T. Stucki
123
Table 9 continued
Variable Sample Treated Control t p [ |t|
firm_size_ [4 Unmatched 0.09322 0.05676 1.58 0.114
Matched 0.09402 0.13675 -1.02 0.308
Market conditions
price_competition Unmatched 0.48305 0.41441 1.44 0.151
Matched 0.48718 0.45299 0.52 0.602
non_price_competition Unmatched 0.61864 0.53604 1.71 0.087
Matched 0.61538 0.66667 -0.82 0.416
Summary of the distribution of the abs(bias)
Mean abs(bias) Unmatched 16.25
Matched 7.02
LR chi2 Unmatched 187.42***
Matched 20.93
Furthermore, control variables for region and industry affiliation were included. All these variables are not significantly different for
the matched treated and control units
***, **, * Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % test level, respectively




Table 10 Test balancing property and common support of model (2)
Variable Sample Treated Control t p [ |t|
Founder characteristics
average_age Unmatched 36.568 39.923 -2.86 0.004
Matched 36.696 36.17 0.36 0.716
dominant_gender Unmatched 0.74603 0.7129 0.55 0.579
Matched 0.7541 0.68852 0.80 0.423
technical_share Unmatched 0.44974 0.45726 -0.12 0.901
Matched 0.45902 0.46175 -0.03 0.973
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Table 10 continued
Variable Sample Treated Control t p [ |t|
creativity Unmatched 4.254 3.8242 3.16 0.002
Matched 4.2459 4.4426 -1.53 0.128
Financial structure
personal_savings Unmatched 3.8889 4.1661 -1.67 0.095
Matched 3.8525 3.7705 0.30 0.764
retained_earning Unmatched 3.4444 2.5677 4.12 0.000
Matched 3.4098 3.377 0.12 0.908
private_loans Unmatched 2.6349 1.829 4.32 0.000
Matched 2.6066 2.7377 -0.44 0.658
bank_loan Unmatched 1.9206 1.5419 2.52 0.012
Matched 1.9344 2.0164 -0.34 0.736
customer_prepayments Unmatched 1.746 1.2774 3.95 0.000
Matched 1.7213 1.8033 -0.33 0.742
supplier_credit Unmatched 1.4603 1.1548 3.69 0.000
Matched 1.4262 1.4098 0.09 0.929
public_funding Unmatched 1.4444 1.0565 6.46 0.000
Matched 1.3443 1.3115 0.20 0.839
Firm characteristics
public_limited_company Unmatched 0.36508 0.14355 4.59 0.000
Matched 0.36066 0.2623 1.17 0.244
private_limited_company Unmatched 0.30159 0.23548 1.17 0.243
Matched 0.31148 0.29508 0.20 0.845
legally_independent Unmatched 0.90476 0.98387 -4.00 0.000
Matched 0.90164 0.91803 -0.31 0.754
tertiary_employees Unmatched 0.74603 0.66613 1.29 0.198
Matched 0.77049 0.77049 0.00 1.000
business_plan Unmatched 0.50794 0.40161 1.63 0.103
Matched 0.5082 0.52459 -0.18 0.858
many_customers Unmatched 0.52381 0.5629 -0.59 0.552
Matched 0.52459 0.52459 0.00 1.000
export_share Unmatched 1.0509 0.79274 1.31 0.192
Matched 1.0853 1.0635 0.07 0.942
firm_size_1–2 Unmatched 0.26984 0.26129 0.15 0.883
Matched 0.27869 0.21311 0.84 0.405
firm_size_2–4 Unmatched 0.14286 0.1 1.06 0.289
Matched 0.14754 0.14754 0.00 1.000
firm_size_ [4 Unmatched 0.07937 0.05645 0.74 0.461
Matched 0.08197 0.03279 1.16 0.246
Market conditions
price_competition Unmatched 0.49206 0.40161 1.39 0.165
Matched 0.4918 0.44262 0.54 0.590
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Table 10 continued
Variable Sample Treated Control t p [ |t|
non_price_competition Unmatched 0.63492 0.52258 1.70 0.089
Matched 0.62295 0.59016 0.37 0.714
Summary of the distribution of the abs(bias)
Mean abs(bias) Unmatched 19.99
Matched 8.62
LR chi2 Unmatched 125.78***
Matched 22.02
Furthermore, control variables for region and industry affiliation were included. All these variables are not significantly different for
the matched treated and control units
***, **, * Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % test level, respectively




Table 11 Test balancing property and common support of model (3)
Variable Sample Treated Control t p [ |t|
Founder characteristics
average_age Unmatched 36.305 39.704 -2.32 0.021
Matched 36.305 36.804 -0.30 0.769
dominant_gender Unmatched 0.675 0.70864 -0.44 0.657
Matched 0.675 0.625 0.46 0.644
technical_share Unmatched 0.4375 0.46337 -0.34 0.733
Matched 0.4375 0.52917 -0.91 0.364
creativity Unmatched 4.275 3.8321 2.59 0.010
Matched 4.275 4.375 -0.60 0.550
Financial structure
personal_savings Unmatched 4.075 4.1481 -0.36 0.722
Matched 4.075 4.175 -0.34 0.732
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Table 11 continued
Variable Sample Treated Control t p [ |t|
retained_earning Unmatched 3.225 2.6667 2.10 0.036
Matched 3.225 3.375 -0.42 0.672
private_loans Unmatched 2.775 1.7852 4.29 0.000
Matched 2.775 2.7 0.19 0.846
bank_loan Unmatched 2.025 1.5877 2.23 0.026
Matched 2.025 2.1 -0.24 0.813
customer_prepayments Unmatched 1.7 1.2914 2.67 0.008
Matched 1.7 1.675 0.09 0.932
supplier_credit Unmatched 1.425 1.1383 2.97 0.003
Matched 1.425 1.275 0.77 0.446
public_funding Unmatched 1.325 1.0494 4.45 0.000
Matched 1.325 1.125 1.33 0.187
Firm characteristics
public_limited_company Unmatched 0.225 0.1358 1.53 0.126
Matched 0.225 0.2 0.27 0.788
private_limited_company Unmatched 0.35 0.26173 1.20 0.231
Matched 0.35 0.375 -0.23 0.819
legally_independent Unmatched 0.925 0.98765 -2.86 0.004
Matched 0.925 0.9 0.39 0.697
tertiary_employees Unmatched 0.7 0.66667 0.43 0.670
Matched 0.7 0.7 0.00 1.000
business_plan Unmatched 0.475 0.39506 0.98 0.326
Matched 0.475 0.575 -0.89 0.377
many_customers Unmatched 0.525 0.58025 -0.67 0.501
Matched 0.525 0.55 -0.22 0.825
export_share Unmatched 1.0025 0.7579 1.03 0.306
Matched 1.0025 0.89279 0.31 0.756
firm_size_1–2 Unmatched 0.225 0.2716 -0.63 0.526
Matched 0.225 0.2 0.27 0.788
firm_size_2–4 Unmatched 0.15 0.10617 0.84 0.399
Matched 0.15 0.15 -0.00 1.000
firm_size_ [4 Unmatched 0.025 0.05926 -0.90 0.370
Matched 0.025 0.025 -0.00 1.000
Market conditions
price_competition Unmatched 0.45 0.41975 0.37 0.713
Matched 0.45 0.475 -0.22 0.825
non_price_competition Unmatched 0.6 0.54815 0.63 0.530
Matched 0.6 0.625 -0.23 0.821
Summary of the distribution of the abs(bias)
Mean abs(bias) Unmatched 19.53
Matched 9.08
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